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T
o  stimulate  the  efficiency  of  utilities  in  the  drinking  water   
sector,  different  countries  employ  heterogeneous  incentive   
schemes. By the use of a cross-country comparison of Dutch,   
Belgian, English and Welsh, Australian and Portuguese utilities, 
this article demonstrates the effectiveness of regulatory incentive schemes 
such as benchmarking and yardstick competition. It employs bias-corrected 
Data Envelopment Analysis efficiency estimates and it takes the physical, 
social and institutional environment into account.
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The use of benchmarking
Benchmarking can be defined, in a simple way, as the process of seeking best practices 
through a regular comparison of performance measures. In the drinking water sector, which is 
endowed with several market failures such as natural monopoly, sunk costs, externalities and 
asymmetric information, benchmarking obtains a key role. As regional monopolists, water utilities 
can provide the service at a high cost and poor service level and sometimes earn unreasonable and 
unfair profits. The benchmarking is even pointed up as the unique tool to fight the quiet life of Hicks 
(1935) and the X-inefficiency of Leibenstein (1966). In this sense, it replaces the competitive incen-
tives by competition by comparison. In Europe, there is even a view that defends a new paradigm 
for the water sector based on use and abuse of benchmarking (Marques and Witte, 2008).
Several kinds of benchmarking exist and are applied with diverse aims. For example, 
benchmarking can be classified into bottom up or top down, into metric or process and regulatory 
or non-regulatory. The methods to benchmark can further be divided into total or partial, parametric 
or non-parametric, frontier or non-frontier and stochastic and deterministic. They can also be 
applied by different actors, for instance operators, regulators, customers and financial entities. 
Benchmarking can be used by the operators as a tool to improve the performance, but it can 
simultaneously be employed by regulators as a tool to establish tariffs or to enforce the operators 
to improve the quality of service (labelled as yardstick competition). Even the ‘name and shame’ 
strategy of the performance, known as sunshine regulation, put into practice by some regulators, 
leads to good outcomes (Marques, 2006). However, independently of the stakeholder, benchmar-
king has always common principles and goals. All benchmarking methodologies intend to assess 
performance, measuring the inputs consumed and the results (outputs) produced and, as such to 
compute the efficiency of activities, processes or organizations.
In this article, we apply benchmarking with a different aim. We assess the performance of 
drinking water utilities by country, intending to identify the best practices regarding the incentives 
provided to water utilities to be efficient and to provide the value for money. By the non-parametric 
frontier benchmarking technique of Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), we carry out an interna-
tional benchmarking research comparing the efficiency of drinking water utilities while taking into 
account the institutional framework and the operational environment of five countries, respectively, 
the Netherlands, England and Wales, Australia, Portugal and Belgium (Witte and Marques, 2007a). 
The model accounts for a-typical observations and measurement errors and investigates if the 
existence of incentive regulation has a positive influence on the efficiency of water utilities. In 
addition, we first commentate on mergers which, although undermining the effectiveness of the 
benchmark, are often justified on the basis of scale economies and inefficiency reductions.
The paper is organized as follows. Next to this introduction, Section 2 highlights the 
advantages and problems of carrying out international benchmarking studies. Section 3 displays 
the selection and main features of the countries and their water sector included in the research. 
Afterwards Section 4 briefly introduces the non-parametric methodology used to measure the ef-
ficiency of  drinking water utilities and discusses the main results. Section 5 concludes the paper.
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Benchmarking versus merger economies
In many countries, the number of comparable utilities is too low to make a valuable 
benchmark study. This can be attributed to the many mergers in the sector. We start this section by 
discussing the absence of merger economies.
2.1  Merger economies
Many drinking water utilities are invoking economies of scale and inefficiency reductions 
when they try to argument a merger with another utility. As it is hard to proof that mergers in the 
drinking water sector indeed create scale economies, regulators often give the benefit of the doubt 
to merging companies. However, by merging, the number of comparable utilities in the sample 
decreases, so that benchmarking becomes more intricate. Indeed, after the last merger, the one re-
maining utility is efficient by default. However, recent research proofs that mergers in the drinking 
water sector do not provide merger economies (De Witte and Dijkgraaf, 2007).
The literature distinguishes three possible merger economies (Roller et al., 2000). Firstly, 
merger economies could arise from the increased market power. In a benchmarking context, this 
corresponds to the decrease of comparable utilities, so that the remaining companies could more 
easily invoke different exogenous characteristics. Secondly, merger economies could arise from an 
increase in scale economies, i.e. by operating at a larger scale, costs per unit decrease. Thirdly, mer-
ging companies could benefit from increased incentives to fight inefficiencies. This is particularly 
the case when stakeholders agreed on the merger on the basis of cost reductions. 
By the use of both non-parametric and parametric techniques, De Witte and Dijkgraaf 
(2007) show for the Dutch drinking water sector that the large efficiency gains in the sector could 
be attributed to the effect of benchmarking, while the merger economies, both in the sense of 
scale economies and increased incentives to fight inefficiencies, are absent. Only for very small 
companies, merger economies are detected. Therefore, they conclude that regulators should be 
suspicious to mergers and do not give them the benefit of the doubt. However, if scale economies 
would be present, the regulator can opt for an international benchmark study to compensate for the 
decrease in comparable units.
2.2  International comparisons
With only few remaining utilities, companies can easily invoke exogenous characte-
ristics. To circumvent this problem, utilities from other countries and regions could be added to 
the reference sample. An international benchmark study arises. As pointed out in De Witte and 
Marques (2007a), a cross-country comparison offers some advantages. 
Firstly, it offers the possibility to escape the unsteady equilibrium between the claimed 
economies of scale for merging utilities and a sufficient number of remaining comparators in the 
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sample. Secondly, also the best practices, which are usually the same for a longer period of time, can 
be benchmarked. This creates additional incentives for those utilities. Indeed, the possibility that a 
national best practice remains the reference in an enlarged data set decreases. Finally, international 
benchmark studies allow comparing the incentive schemes in different countries. Therefore, in an 
international data set, we measure the efficiency of water utilities by the use of DEA. After cor-
recting bias in the efficiency estimates and after taking into account environmental factors, which 
are out of control of the firm’s management, we evaluate the effect on efficiency of a benchmarking 
and regulation incentive scheme. 
However, these advantages come at a cost as international benchmarking creates some 
difficulties as well. Especially the intricate comparability of the data sources should attract a lot of 
attention. Indeed, national regulators and utilities employ different definitions of similar concepts. 
For example, the definition of medium and large sized customers differs even within countries. 
Therefore, one should be cautious when merging these samples. Secondly, the data could also suffer 
from exogenous differences which influence the values. For example, exchange rate fluctuations or 
purchasing power differences could give rise to differences in the sample. Thirdly, in some countries 
a larger extent of the activities are outsourced to specialized companies, so that the total number 
of employees and staff costs differ. Finally, heterogeneity arising from exogenous characteristics 
should be taken into account to obtain a fair comparison.
In spite of these difficulties, we think it is possible to perform an international benchmark 
study. In particular, we account for the intricate lack of comparability of the data by making four 
specific assumptions. Firstly, we adopt variables in quantities (e.g., the inputs staff and mains 
length) that are less susceptible to the lack of comparability. Secondly, the major differences among 
countries are related to taxation issues. However, thanks to the quantities variables, tax heterogen-
eity does not significantly influence the model. Thirdly, also other heterogeneous factors which 
characterize the operational and institutional environment are integrated in the second stage ana-
lysis of the model. Fourthly, we removed outliers and a-typical observations from the data set. For 
example, the Australian water services, which may seem very different from the others, correspond 
only to major cities of Australia, and thus, are more comparable to the other observations. 259
Cross-country comparision
Many approaches are suggested to solve the principle-agent problem in which the mo-
nopolistic utilities (the agents) have private information about their ability to transform inputs 
into outputs. As society (the principal) wants a guaranteed service at the lowest price possible, 
the utilities can extract information rents. The objective of society is to minimize the extraction of 
information rents while assuring a satisfactory service. Policy makers can apply a broad range of 
incentive schemes in order to reach this goal (see, e.g., Laffont and Tirole, 1993). Although every 
government wants a secure drinking water provision at a price as low as possible, countries have 
different ideological views on the extent of state intervention in the economy, which creates dif-
ferent incentive schemes. In this article, we selected five countries which each have some specific 
incentive regulatory characteristics: the Netherlands, England and Wales, Australia, Portugal and 
Belgium. For each of these countries, the data are obtained from the sector associations and regu-
lators for the year 2005 (except for Belgium where we have 2004 data). 
After a debate on the possibilities to deregulate monopolistic markets (among which the 
drinking water sector), the Dutch drinking water utilities started a voluntary benchmarking in 1997. 
The benchmarking works on the principle of ‘naming and shaming’ and is closely observed by the 
Dutch public opinion (Van Dijk et al., 2007). 
In England and Wales, the Thatcher administration privatised the water sector in 1989. 
To avoid the exploitation of the newly established regional monopolists, three regulators were 
established, from which the Office of Water Services (OFWAT) is the economic regulator. It uses 
yardstick competition to set drinking water prices and to monitor the utilities (Bakker, 2003). 
Australia benefitted from the US and UK regulatory models in that they incorporated the 
US ideas of transparency, enactment and accountability and the UK ideas of performance incentives. 
Australia possesses a strict regulatory model which aims at sustainability and corporatization.  
Portugal employs regulation for its private utilities, while public utilities are not triggered 
by incentive regulation. Only recently, benchmarking was introduced in the sector.
In the federal country of Belgium, the Walloon area started benchmarking in 2006 (hence, 
not observable in our data yet) while the Flemish utilities are not influenced by incentives. In both 
regions, the maximum drinking water prices for a particular provision area are determined by 




Efficiency can be measured by a broad range of tools. A first branch of methodologies are 
the parametric cost functions. These assume a specific functional form to the data and could easily 
incorporate exogenous characteristics and measurement errors. In this article, we focus on a second 
branch of methodologies, non-parametric models which do not assume any a priori assumptions on 
the data and, therefore, let the data speak for themselves. We concentrate on the Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA) model. We briefly explain this approach. 
Consider Figure 1 where the horizontal axis presents a one dimensional input and the 
vertical axis a one dimensional output. Observation A denotes the evaluated utility with inputs 
x and outputs y. In an input-oriented model, DEA detects all observations which are using less 
inputs to produce the same amount of outputs. In an output-oriented model, DEA considers all 
observations which are producing more outputs for a given amount of inputs. For observation A, 
this corresponds to all observations in its fourth quadrant. We label these observations as dominant 
observations relative to A. Some observations are not dominated by any of the reference points. 
These undominated observations constitute the best practice frontier. Any deviation relative to the 
best practice frontier is considered as inefficiency. The input-oriented inefficiency for observation 
A corresponds to the distance AB relative to the distance AC. Its output-oriented inefficiency cor-
responds to the distance AD relative to DE. Obviously, observations which constitute the frontier 
obtain an efficiency score of 1, while inefficient observations obtain scores larger than 1.   
However, Simar and Wilson (1998, 2000) point out that not the full distance AB or AD 
could be attributed to inefficiency. A part of this distance is due to measurement errors, a-typical 
observations which influence the shape of the frontier and noise in the data. Taken together this 
corresponds to the bias. We account for the bias by bootstrapping (i.e., repeatedly estimating the 
problem with small disturbance in the input variables). Thanks to these bootstrap estimates, we 
can induce the properties of the DEA estimates. We refer to Simar and Wilson (1998, 2000) for an 
extensive introduction in the methodology. 
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Figure 1. DEA BEST PRACTICE FRONTIER
Graph 1
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In the assessment of efficiency, an objective and fair comparison is needed. Therefore, we 
have to equalize all physical, social and institutional characteristics which are beyond the scope of 
the firm’s managers. We include three physical variables: (1) the percentage of leakage (it captures 
the geographical relief as a hilly landscape requires more pressure on the mains and the extent of 
maintenance as more leakages correspond to less expenses with maintenance), (2) groundwater use 
(the production cost is much lower than the counterparts that abstract superficial water or import 
water from other utilities) and (3) delivery to medium and large sized customers. The social varia-
bles capture the characteristics of the customers. Firstly, gross regional product (GRP) captures the 
relative wealth of the customers, the difference in skill distribution (see above) and approximates 
the average productivity of a region. Secondly, water consumption per capita reflects demand side 
management. By the institutional variables we try to capture (1) the scope economies (i.e., the 
only activity is the delivery of drinking water), (2) the corporization (i.e., the hard or soft budget 
constraints), (3) the scale economies (i.e., delivery to more than three municipalities) and finally, 
the type of incentive regulation, i.e. (4) yardstick competition or (5) benchmarking.
The literature developed several procedures to incorporate environmental characteristics 
in DEA efficiency scores. Initially, the literature employed truncated Tobit regressions to detect the 
size and direction of the exogenous influence. However, these models suffer from a separability 
condition in that the heterogeneity does not influence the shape of the frontier. Therefore, Simar 
and Wilson (1998, 2000) develop a double bootstrap procedure and Daraio and Simar (2005) 
introduced the conditional efficiency estimates. The latter procedures are combined in De Witte 
and Marques (2007a). As in De Witte and Marques (2007b), in this article we use the residuals of 
the truncated Tobit regression to incorporate the environmental variables. By using the residuals of 
the Tobit regression, we avoid the above mentioned separability condition.
We first present the results of the bias corrected double bootstrap procedure in Table 1. 
A positive sign denotes a negative influence to efficiency (i.e., an increase in inefficiency) while 
a negative sign points to a positive influence to efficiency (i.e., a decrease in inefficiency). We 
observe that industrial customers, high consumption per capita and corporatization decrease the 
efficiency of the utilities. Contrary, a higher proportion of leakage, groundwater extraction, GRP, 
scope economies, scale economies, regulation and benchmarking increase the efficiency of utilities. 
All of these variables have the expected sign, except for leakage.
By the use of the residuals of the Tobit regression, we correct the efficiency scores for these 
characteristics. The average results, as presented in Table 2, show the efficiency scores as would all 
utilities face exactly the same physical, social and institutional environment (indeed, all other influences 
than the incorporated are captured by the intercept). We observe that in comparison to the uncorrected 
efficiencies, the Belgian and private Portuguese utilities gain most. The efficiency of the Dutch companies 
even reduces if exogenous characteristics are taken into account. More interesting is the fourth column 
of Table 2 where we equalize all physical, social and institutional influences, except for the effect of 
regulation and benchmarking. The comparison of the latter with the equalized efficiency scores indicates 
the positive effect of benchmarking and regulation. Indeed, it reveals the effectiveness of the Dutch 
benchmarking scheme (as the Dutch companies are performing more efficient if benchmarking is taken 
into account) and the power of the English and Welsh, Australian and (private) Portuguese regulatory 
models. As there is no clear incentive structure for the Belgian and Portuguese public utilities, their aver-
age efficiency falls in comparison to the equalized situation. The Belgian and Portuguese authorities could 
ameliorate the performances of their drinking water sector by introducing a clear incentive scheme.262
Table 1
Influence of exogenous environment







5 % 5 %
Intercept 4,2216 *** 1,9184 6,6944
Leakage (%) -0,02258 *** -0,06406 0,01550
Industry water/household
delivery 0,02396 *** 0,01353 0,03404








Water unique activity (=1) -0,2644 *** -1,0319 0,4602
Corporatization (=1) 1,2254 *** -0,3341 2,6574
Delivery in one
municipality (=1) -1,3448 *** -2,4574 -0,3601
Regulator (=1) -0,9637 *** -2,1884 0,1741
Benchmarking (=1) -0,1198 *** -1,3720 1,1548
*** denotes significance at a 1%-level
Source: De Witte and Marques (2007)
Source: De Witte and Marques (2007)
Table 2
Average corrected efficiency scores
Table 2: Average corrected efficiency scores
Method Uncorrected All influences Incentive
efficiencies equalized scheme
The Netherlands 1.216 1.274 1.322
England and Wales 1.358 1.202 1.219
Australia 1.453 1.322 1.331
Portugal public 1.761 1.554 1.524
Portugal private 1.741 1.411 1.372
Belgium 1.600 1.355 1.347
source: De Witte and Marques (2007)
Source: De Witte and Marques (2007)263
Conclusion
The analysis provides significant evidence for the positive effects of incentive schemes 
on efficiency and demonstrates that in absence of clear and structural incentives the average ef-
ficiency of utilities even falls in comparison with utilities which are encouraged by incentives. 
The natural monopoly in the drinking water sector leads to the quiet life of Hicks (1935) and 
X-inefficiency of Leibenstein (1966). The presence of benchmarking (in the sense of sunshine 
regulation or yardstick competition) is a key element which replaces competition in the market or 
competition for the market by competition by comparison.
The analysis allows to deduce some policy implications. Firstly, regulators and govern-
ment should be suspicious regarding mergers in the water sector. Often, mergers are invoked 
on a scale economies reasoning. However, mergers reduce the effectiveness of the benchmark. 
Secondly, as the benchmarking proofs its effectiveness as a regulatory tool, it should be extended to 
more variables. In addition, to prevent gaming (in which utilities spend huge resources to improve 
the measured variables on the cost of the unmeasured variables), government should supervise the 
scope of the benchmark, in particular the included variables. Thirdly, to allow for a fair compari-
son among utilities, the employed definitions should be harmonized within countries and among 
countries.
REFERENCES
Aubin, D. and Varane, F., 2007, Country report Belgium. In Water and Liberalisation, European 
Water Scenarios. Editors Finger, M., Allouche, J. and Luis-Manso, P., IWA publishing. 
Bakker, K., 2003, From public to private to... mutual? Restructuring water supply governance in 
England and Wales, Geoforum 34 (3), 359-374.
Belgaqua, 2007, Overzicht van de beheersstructuren in België, Belgische federatie voor de water-
sector, p. 32.
Daraio, C. and Simar, L., 2005, Introducing environmental variables in nonparametric frontier 
models: a probabilistic approach, Journal of productivity analysis, 24 (1), 93-121.
De Witte, K. and Dijkgraaf, E., 2007, Mean and Bold? On separating merger economies from struc-
tural efficiency gains in the drinking water sector, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper, 092/3.
De Witte, K. and Marques, R., 2007a, Designing incentives in local public utilities, an international 
comparison to the drinking water sector, CES Discussion Paper Series DPS 07,32.
De Witte, K. and Marques, R., 2007b, Regulering brengt efficiëntie in de drinkwatersector,   
Economisch Statistische Berichten, vol 92, no, 4506.
De Witte, K. and Marques, R., 2008, Optimal Incentives in Local Public Utilities: an International 
Benchmark study of the Drinking Water Sector, Proceedings IWA 2008 conference, Valencia. 
5.264
Dijkgraaf, E., de Jong, R., van de Mortel, E.G., Nentjes, A., Varkevisser, M. and Wiersma, D., 
1997, Mogelijkheden tot marktwerking in de Nederlandse watersector, Onderzoeksreeks directie 
marktwerking, Ministerie van Economische Zaken, The Hague, 1-93.
Hicks, J. (1935), Annual survey of economic theory: the theory of monopoly, Econometrica 3 (1), 
1-20.
Laffont, J.J. and Tirole, J., 1993, A Theory of incentives in procurement and regulation, MIT 
Press.
Leibenstein, H. (1966), Allocative efficiency vs, ‘X-efficiency’, The American Economic Review 
56 (3), 392-415.
Lobina, E. and Hall, D., 2001, UK water privatisation - a briefing, Public Services International 
Research Unit, PSIRU, 1-27.
Marques, R. (2006), A yardstick competition model for Portuguese water and sewerage services 
regulation, Utilities Policy, 14 (3), 175-184.
Marques, R. and De Witte, K. (2008), Towards a benchmarking paradigm in the water and sewerage 
services, Forthcoming in ‘Public Money and Management’.
Röller, L., Stennek, J. and Verboven, F. (2000), Efficiency gains from mergers, The Research 
Institute of Industrial Economics, Stockholm.
SERV, 2007, Informatiedossier. De Watersector: analyse en uitdagingen, Sociaal Ecomische Raad 
van Vlaanderen, p. 141. 
Simar, L. and Wilson, P. (1998), Sensitivity analysis of efficiency scores: how to bootstrap in 
nonparametric frontier models, Management Science, 44 (1), 49-61.
Simar, L. and Wilson, P. (2000), Statistical inference in nonparametric frontier models: the state of 
the art, Journal of Productivity Analysis, 13 (1), 49-78.
Van Dijk, P., Schouten, M., Swami, K. and Kooij, M., 2007, Country report on the Netherlands. 
In Water and Liberalisation, European Water Scenarios, Editors Finger, M., Allouche, J. and Luis-
Manso, P., IWA publishing. 
Vewin,  2007a,  Reflections  on  performance  2006, Association  of  Dutch  Water  Companies, 
Rijswijk.
Vewin, 2007b, Internationale benchmark krijgt vervolg, Waterspiegel 10 (1), 19-21.